The Injustice of Exploitation

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Is exploitation unjust? This essay attempts to resolve this famous question by suggesting a new approach to the relationship between exploitation and injustice. The literature on exploitation so far has focussed almost exclusively on the question of the circumstances of exploitation. This paper, by contrast, consists in investigating a different question, namely: what are the motives of exploitation? There are two different types of motive behind the act of exploitation: to secure an economic gain by using another person to one’s advantage, and to humiliate and degrade another person for the sake of identifying with power. Understanding exploitation in terms of the latter motive enables us to see the injustice of exploitation from a different angle, pushing us beyond the narrow perspective (popular amongst Marxists) that tends to equate exploitation with the economics of an unfair exchange.

The aim of this article is to explore the reason why acts of exploitation are unjust. So far the literature of exploitation has focussed overwhelmingly on the circumstances of exploitation. I will argue that what makes exploitation unjust cannot be reduced exclusively to its circumstances, instead it is also the motives behind the act of exploitation that determine its injustice. In particular, I will argue that there are two sets of unjust motives that can give rise to exploitative relations: the (economic) motive to make a monetary gain from an unequal exchange, and the (non-economic) motive to morally insult or degrade the exploited party, not for monetary reasons but for the sake of identifying with power. The former (economic) motive finds support in the vast Marxist literature on exploitation, yet the latter (non-economic) motive has regrettably been neglected.

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The Concept of Exploitation

From a philosophical point of view, the two central issues about exploitation are ‘what is exploitation?’ and ‘what is wrong with exploitation?’. Regarding the first question, the act of exploitation is ‘to employ to the greatest possible advantage’ or simply ‘to make use of’. Of course, there is an important difference between ‘exploiting’ and ‘using’. Linguistically I can say that ‘I am using a computer to write this paper’, but it would sound odd to say that ‘I am exploiting the computer to write this paper’. The difference between ‘exploiting’ and ‘using’ is not simply a question of degree, where to exploit refers to using fully or more extensively. There is a qualitative difference between the acts of exploiting and using, although it is not immediately obvious what the distinguishing factor is.

The question is complicated by the slippery nature of the concept of ‘exploitation’, which can legitimately be used in a variety of contexts: the exploitation of a natural resource is different, for example, from the exploitation of another person (Goodin 1987). Furthermore, the exploitation of a person can take different forms: sometimes it is our weaknesses or vulnerabilities that are being exploited, while other times it is our strengths that are being exploited, although most often people are exploited in both their weaknesses and strengths. In turn human vulnerability can take many different forms, being at times physical (as in the case of weaker bargaining position) and at other times metaphysical (as in desires and emotional needs).

In what follows I will restrict my analysis to exploitation as a moral and/or political act. Thus, it is not the exploitation of natural resources (exploiting a coal mine) or certain situation (exploiting the weakness of my chess opponent to win a game) that is at issue, but the exploitation of one person by another person. The question is: how is exploiting another person different from using another person? I want to suggest that there is a fundamental difference, namely, whereas exploitation is an injustice, using another person is not, in fact using another person may not even be wrong. I will first suggest why using another person can be morally acceptable, followed by why exploitation is always morally wrong.

We use other people all the time, without moral remorse. For example, if I am invited to a dinner party, and my partner drives us to the party and back (perhaps because I had a few glasses of wine with the meal), I am technically using my partner to drive us home, but I wouldn’t
say that I am exploiting her. So, what makes exploiting a person different from using a person? Or in other words, what makes exploitation wrong?

The Circumstances of Exploitation

There seems to be widespread (although not unanimous) agreement on the view that exploitation is wrong because it portrays an injustice. It follows that to understand what is wrong with exploitation we need to know why a relation of exploitation constitutes an injustice.

Most of the literature on exploitation explains the injustice of this act in terms of the (structural) circumstances that have made exploitation possible. This type of explanation has a long and distinguished tradition, which includes the vast majority of Marxists' as well as some liberals. The old-fashioned Marxist doctrine on the nature of exploitation, based on the unequal exchange of labour, is so well-known that I will not tax the reader with a summary of it. Suffice it to say that according to this model, it is the structure of capitalism (defined in terms of private-property, capital accumulation and social classes) that encourages the unequal exchange of labour, making exploitation both a reality and an injustice.

Contemporary scholars of exploitation, even those who come from a Marxist background, are critical of the old-fashioned Marxist model. Famously John Roemer (1994: 96) suggests we abandon the classic Marxist definition of exploitation as the unequal exchange of labour and replace it with a different conception, where exploitation is ‘conceived of as the distributional consequences of an unjust inequality in the distribution of productive assets and resources’. According to Roemer, and contrary to what classical Marxists have hitherto argued, exploitation is not in itself a fundamental theory of (in)justice, if by exploitation we mean the extraction of surplus labour at the point of production. In order to perceive its injustice, we need a deeper theory of exploitation, one that gives priority to property relations. Roemer suggests that injustice is essentially a question of unfair or unequal distribution of productive assets and resources. It follows that the injustice of exploitation is the product of the large inequality in access to the means of production.

Hillel Steiner (1984) endorses a similar conclusion to Roemer’s, although he arrives at it via a different route. Steiner holds a liberal
conception of justice, and therefore he offers a liberal reading on exploitation. According to Steiner, injustice is essentially a question of violation of rights. But whose rights are being violated? Counter-intuitively, Steiner tells us that it is not ‘the exploited’ whose rights are being violated. Instead, it is all the third parties that are prevented from interfering in the relations of exploitation between the exploiter and the exploited.

The key to Steiner’s analysis is that we should think of exploitation as a trilateral relation among the exploiter, the exploited and all other parties who suffer rights violation: A (the exploited) exchanges his $5 \times$ for B’s $3 \times$ (the exploiter). While this exchange is voluntary, A is unhappy with the terms of exchange. He would have preferred to exchange his $5 \times$ for someone else’s $5 \times$ (say, C’s $5 \times$), but the possibility of exchange between A and C were not present, due to the interference of B. That is because B (the exploiter) prevented the trade between A (the exploited) and C (a third party), perhaps by forcibly preventing C from offering A $5 \times$ or even $4 \times$. A is the one who is exploited, but C’s rights were violated.

Notwithstanding their differences, there are important similarities between Roemer and Steiner on the question of exploitation, especially on the question of the unequal distribution of natural resources. Roemer sees injustice in the basic structures of capitalist society, for example in the inequality in the access to the means of production. Exploitation is for Roemer merely a consequence of this fundamental injustice. Similarly, it is indicative that Steiner (1984: 238 and 239) explicitly refers to the property system of a society in terms of the ‘institutional circumstances of exploitation’, for example he tells us that ‘exploitation can occur when some persons do not own natural resources’, and that ‘a person’s monopoly ownership of natural resources ... can constitute a circumstance of exploitation’. Steiner suggests land nationalisation as a possible solution to the problem of exploitation. Thus, although Roemer and Steiner focus on different aspects of injustice, they both approach exploitation in terms of the structural circumstances responsible for generating this phenomenon.

To summarise this first position, we can say that exploitation is unjust to the extent that exploitation is the product of an initial inequality in the basic distribution of resources, and in turn this inequality is reinforced by the reality of on-going exploitation. While this model of explanation is laudable, being fundamentally correct in its assessment, it has the drawback of being too limited. Concentrating on the
circumstances of exploitation has the possible drawback of blaming this immoral act on the basic structure of society rather than on the will of the exploiter. In other words, the moral responsibility of the exploiter is diminished when exploitation is explained in terms of structural circumstances. Of course justice is fundamentally about the basic structure of society, as Rawls rightly reminds us, but at the same time there is more to justice than institutional engineering. ⁴ After all, even if there was a more fair distribution of resources, and everyone had an equal access to them, exploitation would not disappear.

The Motives of Exploitation

There are two sides to justice: structural concerns, and motivational concerns. ⁵ The same applies for exploitation. We can think of exploitation in terms of structural circumstances, but also in terms of motivational drives. I believe that switching the focus of analysis from circumstances to motives will go a long way towards shedding new light on the concept of exploitation and the way it relates to injustice.

In a powerful and original analysis of exploitation, Allen W. Wood argues for a distinction between badness and injustice. Exploitation is nearly always a bad thing, but its badness does not always consist in exploitation being unjust. In fact, a society can be pervasively exploitative while remaining fundamentally just. After all, as Wood reminds us, exploitation may benefit the exploited, indeed it may occur with the exploited person’s fully voluntary consent. So: what is wrong with exploitation? Wood (1995: 150–51) tells us that the real reason that makes exploitation objectionable is the following: ‘proper respect for others is violated when we treat their vulnerabilities as opportunities to advance our own interests or projects. It is degrading to have your weaknesses taken advantage of, and dishonorable to use the weaknesses of others for your ends.’

Wood’s analysis of exploitation is radically different from Roemer’s or Steiner’s, to the extent that it accounts for badness even where the exploitation involves no unfairness, injustice or violation of rights. Furthermore, by emphasising that exploitation is bad because it is an affront on people’s human dignity to have their weaknesses used, Wood is pointing to a dimension of exploitation beyond the juridical-economic structuralism of property rights, distribution of resources and rights violation.
Instead of a structural approach (such as we find in Roemer and Steiner), Wood opts for a psychological approach, where exploitation is objectionable because degrading. I suggest we refer to Wood’s analysis as the ‘motivational approach’. It seems to me that there are a number of advantages with the motivational approach. Above all, it reminds us that it is the exploiter who is morally responsible for exploiting a victim of circumstances, which also helps to explain the conceptual difference between exploiting a person and using a person, and why only the former is morally wrong. When we exploit someone, we use them in a particular way which degrades or humiliates them. Kant’s categorical imperative (the formula of the end itself) comes to mind here: ‘Act in such a way that you always treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, never simply as a means, but always at the same time as an end’. The proviso ‘never simply’ in Kant’s formulation is crucial, for in our case it distinguishes using a person from exploiting them: we exploit someone when we don’t respect their dignity by treating them only and exclusively as a means to our end.

Switching our attention away from the circumstances of exploitation, to the motives of exploitation, opens a whole new perspective on the nature and implications of exploitation. It is to the different types of motives of exploitation that I want to turn next.

Economic Motive

In Part I above, I argued that the most popular accounts of exploitation tend to focus on the structural circumstances within which exploitation occurs. This is true of old-fashioned Marxist theories, contemporary models inspired by the Marxist literature (Roemer), and even some liberal models (Steiner). Of course, these theories are not silent about motives, although the motives are usually explained in terms of the structural circumstances. Thus, according to old-fashioned Marxist accounts of exploitation, in the last analysis we can explain why some people (or classes) are exploited by other people (or classes) purely in terms of economic reasons; namely, to extract surplus value from their labour. What is motivating the exploiter is the desire to accumulate more profit, and exploitation is simply a means to this economic end. While Roemer’s and Steiner’s accounts of exploitation steer away from the classic Marxist line, they all share the same motivational assumption. According to Roemer’s property relations definition of exploitation, the technical meaning of ‘exploit’ still remains the unequal exchange of
labour, which suggests that the motive of the exploiter is still the same: namely, to extract a profit from the exploited. Similarly Steiner (1984: 226) tells us that in an exploitative relation ‘the items transferred are held to be of unequal and greater-than-zero value’. The terminology used by Steiner is unambiguously economic, which suggests that the motive is also essentially economic: to force an advantageous exchange whereby the exploiter makes a gain at the expense of the exploited.\

Clearly motives of an economic nature are present in an exploitative exchange, and need to be acknowledged. Yet, there is more to exploitation than the desire to secure an economic gain. Many writers have made this point, arguing that as it is generally defined, especially within the Marxist tradition, the concept of exploitation is much too narrow. The analysis of exploitation by Anthony Giddens (1995), Raymond Murphy (1985), and Iris Marion Young (1990) are an indication of the broad-based lack of satisfaction with the Marxist account of economic motives of exploitation.

Giddens is unhappy with the Marxist predisposition to analyse everything in terms of class and class conflict, a tendency which he believes acts as a straightjacket on the concept of exploitation. Giddens (1995: 60) argues that exploitation is most aptly conceptualised in relation to domination or power: ‘Exploitation may be regarded as domination which is harnessed to sectional interests (domination over nature or domination over human beings).’ Unfortunately Giddens does not tell us what he means by ‘interests’; nevertheless, it is clear that his conception of dominion or power looks beyond the logic of extrapolating economic benefits. In fact one of the merits of Giddens’s analysis is that it does a better job of explaining exploitative relations between states, between ethnic groups, and between the sexes, since these three ‘axes’ of exploitative relationships cannot be reduced exhaustively to class exploitation, nor can they be derived from the theory of surplus value.

Murphy shares the same reservation as Giddens regarding the Marxist conception of exploitation, although he reaches his conclusion following a different path. Murphy compares the Marxist conception of exploitation with the Weberian conception of exclusion, and in the comparison finds the former lacking. According to Murphy, the problem is that the most extreme forms of domination and oppression, even in capitalist society, are not particularly well addressed by the Marxist conception of exploitation. Instead he argues that the Weberian
conception of exclusion does a better job of capturing the reality of domination and oppression. Murphy (1985: 234) explains the Weberian conception of exclusion as follows:

Exclusion is one of two reciprocal modes of what Weber calls social closure, which refers to the mobilization of power in order to enhance or defend a group’s share of rewards or resources ... Exclusionary closure involves the exercise of power in a downward direction through a process of subordination in which one group secures its advantages by closing off the opportunities of another group beneath it that it defines as inferior and ineligible.

One advantage of the Weberian conception of exclusion over the Marxist conception of exploitation is that it allows for cases of sexual or racial oppression without reducing these to the economics of surplus-value and unpaid labour.

Iris Marion Young’s own critique of exploitation builds upon the views of Giddens and Murphy, although she gives a new twist to the story. Like Giddens and Murphy, Young also feels that the Marxist conception of exploitation fails to encompass all forms of oppression. In particular, the Marxist conception of class leaves important phenomena of sexual and racial oppression unexplained. The aim of Young’s (1990: 49) analysis is ‘to indicate the place of a concept of exploitation in a conception of oppression’. Starting from the Marxist idea of the structural process of the transfer of power between social groups, whereby the energies of the have-nots are continuously expended to maintain and augment the power, status and wealth of the have, Young (1990: 50) wants to broaden the concept of exploitation to include other ways in which ‘the labour and energy expenditure of one group benefit another, and reproduces a relation of domination between them’. In terms of gender exploitation, apart from the transfer of the fruits of material labour, Young (1990: 50) refers to ‘the transfer of nurturing and sexual energies to men’. Young argues that the category of menial labour (the labour of servants) allows us to conceptualise a form of exploitation that is racially specific.

The analysis of exploitation put forward by Giddens, Murphy and Young are valuable, as they push for a broader conception of exploitation beyond the sphere of economics. Yet, all three attempts remain lacking on the motivational front. Ultimately Giddens, Murphy and Young fail to give us a reason why A exploits B which is alternative to the reasons
given by Marxists. This is where their analysis is essentially deficient. They think of exploitation as being more than an economic phenomenon, yet they fail to give the non-economic reasons why some people may wish to exploit others.

As we have seen, Giddens (1995: 60) talks about ‘sectional interests’, although he fails to expand on this idea: ‘The concept of interests raises numerous difficulties, which I shall not attempt to confront in this context.’ Is Giddens referring to economic interests? If so, then his analysis adds little to the Marxist conception of exploitation. If he has in mind more than simply economic interests, as I suspect, then he should tell us what these ‘interests’ are. By failing to do so, his contribution to the debate suffers considerably.

Murphy’s account of what Weber calls ‘social closure’ is also unclear on the motivational front. The closest we get to a motive for social closure is the desire for ‘monopolization’, which is the reverse side of exclusion. In Murphy’s (1985: 238) words, ‘Weberian closure theory goes beyond the Marxian conception of exploitation by focussing on the processes of monopolization and exclusion which underlie both the appropriation of labour and exclusion from productive labour’. The problem here is that ‘monopolization’ is essentially an economic term; therefore Weberian closure theory does not seem to add a great deal to the non-economic motives behind exploitation. The suspicion that we are still operating within an economic framework of motives is confirmed by Murphy’s (1985: 234) claim that the aim of exclusion is to enhance or defend a group’s ‘share of rewards or resources’.

Finally, Young’s analysis of exploitation as oppression also fails to address the important question of the motives behind this type of social relation. Young talks about the transfer of ‘energies’, although it is not clear exactly what she means by this term. If ‘energies’ is simply another term for what Marx calls ‘labour-time’, then once again we are confined to the sphere of economics. And if Young has a different conception of ‘energies’, then she should tell us what she has in mind.” To the extent that such energy is expended by one group for the benefit of another group, it would seem that the motive to exploit such ‘energies’ is not fundamentally different from the economic motives captured by the Marxist conception of exploitation.

So, what are the motives of exploitation? And how are these motives different from the Marxist account of economic motives? Exploitation, I want to propose, is motivated by two separate reasons. The first is a
motive by the exploiter to gain an advantage at the cost of the exploited. This is basically what Marx had in mind when he wrote about capitalist exploitation and surplus value, and it also seems to find confirmation in the theories of Roemer and Steiner. I will call this set of economic motives the (EM) model.

But apart from economic reasons, there may be another type of motive behind the desire to exploit others, namely: exploitation may arise from the desire by the exploiter to degrade, humiliate or inflict a moral injury on the exploited party. I will call this set of morally degrading motives the (MDM) model.

Morally Degrading Motive

Clearly morally degrading motives (MDM) are not as straightforward as economic motives (EM), which probably accounts for their neglect and misunderstanding. A common mistake is to associate the desire to degrade or humiliate others with ‘being evil’, where evil is defined as an irrational impulse. I am not denying that evil exists, but I think there are good reasons why we should resist appealing to the idea of evil, understood as an irrational impulse, to explain the phenomenon of exploitation. First of all, appealing to the irrationality of evil is essentially equivalent to giving up on the search for a rational explanation for exploitation: irrationality cannot be explained rationally, therefore one can account for anything and everything by appealing to the irrationality of evil. Second, assuming that one is responsible for one’s actions only if they were within one’s rational control, seeing evil as an irrational craving may lead to the view that an evil person is not responsible for their evil actions.

Therefore, contrary to what may seem at first, I want to suggest that the desire to humiliate or degrade others is not irrational. There may be considerable advantages to the exploiter in degrading or humiliating another person. For example, Jon Elster (1984), following Hegel and Sartre, points to the mental process whereby a mode of consciousness is defined through the negation of another object. This is the case of the master–slave dialectic, where masters paradoxically treat their slaves as less than human while at the same time they need the gratitude of their slaves in order to define themselves as moral human beings. While I fully endorse Elster’s position, in what follows I want to suggest a more specific reason for wanting to humiliate or degrade others: it is not simply to identify with a moral human being, but more specifically (and problematically from a moral point of view) to identify with power.
This idea of ‘identifying with power’ needs to be unpacked. First of all, the desire to ‘identify with power’ should not be confused with the more general desire ‘for power’. In Chapter 10 of *Leviathan*, Hobbes (1994: 50) famously defined power as follows: ‘The power of a man is his present means to obtain some future apparent good.’ He then goes on to specify the meaning of instrumental power: ‘instrumental are those powers which ... are means to and instruments to acquire more, as riches, reputation, friends, and the secret working of God, which men call good luck’. If we accept Hobbes’s account of power, and personally I think there is still a great deal to be said for it, then it is hard to deny that exploitation is ultimately aimed at securing power. Furthermore, given the symbiotic relation between economic power and power in general in contemporary society, it is not surprising to find that economic motives are predominant in exploitative relations. Yet the problem here is that the desire ‘for power’ becomes almost undistinguishable from the (EM) model, whereas we are trying to establish whether there is any validity in the (MDM) model, where exploiters are moved by a different desire to degrade and humiliate vulnerable others.

The key to the desire to ‘identify with power’ lies in the concept of identity in general, and the process of identity formation in particular. Identity is based on differentiation, and differentiation upon disgust, which explains the act of degrading and humiliating. Peter Stallybrass and Allon White (1987: 191) provide us with a powerful account of the way identity relates to what is being rejected via the process of differentiation:

The division of the social into high and low, the polite and the vulgar, simultaneously maps out divisions between the civilized and the grotesque body, between author and hack, between social purity and social hybridization. These divisions, as we have argued, cut across the social formation, topography and the body, in such a way that subject identity cannot be considered independently of these domains. The bourgeois subject continuously defined and re-defined itself through the exclusion of what it marked out as ‘low’ – as dirty, repulsive, noisy, diseased, infectious. Yet that very act of exclusion was constitutive of its identity. The low was internalized under the sign of negation and disgust. But disgust always bears the imprint of desire.
Stallybrass and White’s account can be used to add another dimension to the master-slave dialectic. According to Elster, masters are moved by a desire to identify with a moral human being; instead, following Stallybrass and White we may want to say that masters more specifically want to identify with power. Therefore, the act of degrading and humiliating a vulnerable person is the exploiter’s way of identifying with power.

To recap:

- **(EM) Model**: Economic Motive. Taking advantage of another person’s vulnerability for the sake of securing an economic gain or benefit.
- **(MDM) Model**: Morally Degrading Motive. Degrading or humiliating another person, as a way of differentiating oneself from them, and therefore in the process identifying with power.

The relationship between EM and MDM is complex. Usually these two sets of motives work in tandem. In fact, I suspect that the reason why these two motives have not been distinguished in the literature on exploitation so far is exactly because they are so tightly intermingled. For example, A may extract an economic advantage by exploiting B, while also degrading and humiliating B in the process. This is the case in most unethically run businesses, where the employer enjoys abusing his or her powers so that workers are not only exploited economically, but are also morally injured.

While EM and MDM usually apply simultaneously, these two sets of motives can also act autonomously. As autonomous motives, EM and MDM are self-sufficient. According to the logic of the EM model, A can exploit B exclusively for the sake of extracting an economic advantage from the relation, but without wishing to degrade or humiliate B. This is the case in well-managed businesses, where the employer is liked and respected by the employees. Alternatively, according to the logic of the MDM model, A can have the desire to degrade or humiliate B, even if this fails to result in an obvious economic advantage. In fact in the most extreme cases, A will want to degrade or humiliate B, even if this involves an extra economic cost to A.

The problem with the classic Marxist conception of exploitation is essentially that it accounts only for economic motives, while neglecting the other sets of motives, such as the desire to morally degrade or
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humiliate others. As we have seen, some critics have intuited a lacuna in the Marxist analysis, but have failed to pinpoint with sufficient precision the non-economic reasons why exploitation takes place. This article aims to fill this gap in the analysis of exploitation. Apart from the motive to take advantage of someone’s vulnerability for economic reasons, exploitation may also derive from a motive to morally injure others. This is in line with Wood’s argument that exploitation is ‘insulting and degrading’ to the exploited, even though Wood does not discuss motives of exploitation as such. What makes exploitation insulting and degrading is the fact that the humanity of the exploited party is being violated. It is true that sometimes this desire to insult and degrade others works in conjunction with the economic desires of securing surplus-value, but it does not have to be so. There may be other advantages, of a non-economic nature, being pursued by the exploiter, such as the desire to identify with power. In the last analysis, a comprehensive understanding of the phenomenon of exploitation must allow for both sets of motives.

Conclusion

I started this paper by posing two questions: what is exploitation and why is exploitation wrong. I believe the answers to these two questions are intertwined. A person is exploited when someone else takes advantage of him. The reason why exploitation is wrong is because of the injustice of being taken advantage of. There are different reasons why it is an injustice to take advantage of someone. In part, the injustice of exploitation lies in the unfair circumstances in which agents are forced to operate. Yet this is only part of the problem. There is also the question of the unjust motives of the exploiters to be considered. Thus, in this article I have argued for the benefits of switching our attention away from a concern for the circumstances of exploitation, to the motives of exploitation. Regarding the motives, I have argued that exploitation can arise from two distinct sets of reasons: the motive to secure an economic gain by using another person for one’s economic benefits (the EM model), or alternatively the motive to humiliate and degrade another person for the sake of identifying with power (the MDM model). Contrary to what narrower Marxist conceptions of exploitation tend to suggest, the desire to humiliate and degrade is part of the general phenomenon of exploitation, as it conforms with the conventional English usage of the term, whereby to exploit means to ‘utilize’.
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NOTES

1. Today most Marxists, or at least those who are not afraid to argue for a Marxist theory of justice, see exploitation as fundamentally unjust. This is the view of Jon Elster (1986: 79), who claims ‘exploitation is a normative concept that is part of a wider theory of distributive justice’.

2. Of course, I am aware that Marxism has regrettably gone out of fashion in recent years, and it is possible that contemporary students of politics have not been urged to read works by or on Marx. Ernest Mandel (1970: 23–4), an influential Marxist luminary writing in the 1960s and 1970s, explains the concept of exploitation, or surplus-value, in the following terms: ‘Surplus-value is simply the monetary form of the social surplus product, that is to say, it is the monetary form of that part of the worker’s production which he surrenders to the owner of the means of production without receiving anything in return’ (emphasis in original). For more recent accounts of the classic Marxist analysis of exploitation, see J. Reiman (1987).

3. Roemer’s theory of exploitation is much more complex, and much more sophisticated, than suggested by my brief overview. The locus classicus of Roemer’s theory remains his A General Theory of Exploitation and Class (1982). He has since slightly changed his position (Roemer 1988, 1994).

4. Rawls (1972) himself would agree, as his often neglected account of moral psychology in Part III of A Theory of Justice testifies.

5. Brian Barry (1993) is right to remind us that any theory of justice must address the question: ‘What is the motive for behaving justly?’. Indeed, the issue of the motives of justice is central to many contemporary debates on social justice.

6. It is interesting to note that Steiner refuses to go down the road of motives, dismissing any claim based on psychological generalisations, such as statements about the motivational factors underlying individuals’ behaviour. Steiner’s rejection of psychological generalisations is perplexing. Apart from the fact that questions of moral motives are central to our concerns for social justice (and therefore also exploitation), the circumstances of exploitation and the motives of exploitation are two sides of the same coin. That is to say, one of the reasons why it is important for just institutions to be in place is exactly because the institutional set up of a just society will, amongst other things, motivate people to act justly. Samuel Scheffler (1992: 138) makes the important point that ‘social institutions have a role to play in fostering those beliefs that are in turn required if certain basic sorts of human relationship are to flourish’. The fact that the circumstances of justice inspire the motives of justice should alert us to the possibility that the circumstances of exploitation affect our motives of exploitation.

7. I should add that ‘motivational approach’ is my terminology, not Wood’s. I don’t know whether Wood would agree with the use of this terminology.


10. Bernard Gert (1998: 90) argues that ‘there is a close relationship between the objects
of irrational desires and evils. In fact, an evil or a harm can be initially defined as the object of an irrational desire'.

11. For two outstanding recent studies on power, see Morrisey (1987) and Dowding (1991).
12. I am grateful to Joos Gilson-Ellis for making me aware of this book.

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